Les préférences des électeurs dépendent de l'information disponible. Nous faisons l'hypothèse que cette information est traitée de manière additive. Nous montrons que les préférences collectives déduites des préférences individuelles au moyen d'un vote à la majorité qualifiée ne peuvent être arbitraires. La preuve utilise un résultat nouveau sur les marches aléatoires.
Introduction
The purpose of this note is to point out a somewhat unexpected relation between random walks and some aspects of voting theory. Our model is the following. Voters' preferences are inßuenced by the information that gets available prior to the election day. This information may take the form of a collection of facts, arguments or cases that are brought forth. We here assume that this information is processed in an additive manner by each voter. To This class of decision procedures has been introduced into economics and axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) following some work in AI and psychology.
Our interest lies in understanding whether these assumptions on individual preferences can be tested at the aggregate level: does the collective preference relation derived from individual preferences through qualiÞed majority voting exhibit any speciÞc pattern? or is it purely arbitrary? In other 2 words, knowing how the population of voters reacts facing some evidence, can we infer anything regarding its reaction to additionnal information ?
Let X be the (Þnite) set of alternatives and C the (Þnite) universe of all possible cases, and let q ≥ 1/2 be the quota. A society π is deÞned by a (Þnite) set N of voters and by the vector (w i (x, c)) i∈N,c∈C,x∈X of individual preferences. Collective preferences are deÞned using majority vote with quota q: given a subset D ⊂ C and two alternatives x and y, x (resp. y) is weakly preferred to y (resp. to x) by society if no more than q of the voters strictly prefers y to x (resp. x to y) given D. Thus, a given society induces a map that associates to any non-empty subset D of C the above reßexive binary relation over X.
The case q = 1/2 is analysed in Gilboa and Vieille (2002) . It is shown that majority voting may be unpredictable in the sense that any such map may be the outcome of majority voting. We here prove that this result is speciÞc to the case q = 1/2 and that, for higher quotas, binary relations arising from majority voting have some structure. Put somewhat loosely, collective preferences between any two alternatives cannot be reversed by adding an extra piece of information, provided much information is already available.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the model and to the statement of the result. The proof of the main result is given in Section 3 3, which emphasizes the connection to random walk theory and sampling.
The proof is based on a new result on random walks, the proof of which is given in Section 4.
Model and Result

Individual and collective preferences
We let two Þnite sets X and C be given. The set X is the set of alternatives that are being considered. Most of the paper will focus on the case |X| = 2.
The set C is the universe of all facts (or cases, stories, etc.) that may be (publicly) known. A population π is described by the set N of voters, together with the individual preferences over X. Preferences of a voter i ∈ N over X depends on the available information, that may be any non-empty subset of C. We make the assumption that information is processed additively.
SpeciÞcally, the preferences of voter i are characterized by a function w i :
X × C →R, with the interpretation that, given information D ⊂ C, voter i prefers alternative x over alternative y if
A population π is described by the set N of individuals, together with the collection (w i ) i∈N of preferences.
Let P * (C) be the set of non-empty subsets of C and R be the set of (complete) reßexive binary relations over X. Let a population π = (N, (w i )) be given. Individual preferences are aggregated using majority voting with quota q. Fix D ∈ P * (C) and let x, y be any two alternatives. Alternative x is preferred to alternative y given D,
Thus, π induces a map M π :
Results
The imposed structure on individual preferences implies much correlation between the preferences of voter i given various informations. As an illustration, the following holds, given two disjoints sets D 1 and D 2 . If voter i prefers x to y given either D 1 or D 2 , he still prefers x to y given both D 1 and
Our main focus is in understanding whether any correlation still exists at the collective level.
The following result, due to Gilboa and Vieille (2002) shows that this correlation may entirely vanish at the aggregate level, if q = . When C is a singleton, the statement below is a slight generalization of a result due to McGarvey (1953) .
Our main point is to show that Theorem 1 does not extend to q > 1 2
.
We limit ourselves to two alternatives x and y. This case allows for several simpliÞcations. First, individual preferences w i : X × C →R are equivalently described by w i (c) :
Next, an element % of R can be identiÞed to the set of winning alternatives, i.e. to x, to y or to {x, y} if respectively x Â y , y Â x or neither of the two holds.
|C| is even and M(C) = y if |C| is odd. If |C| is large enough, there is no
This result may be paraphrased by saying that collective preferences M π , whenever anonymous, cannot be easily reversed as soon as much information is already available. The statement may be strengthened in many respects, as will be clear from the proof in Section 3. The present one has the merit of simplicity.
The formula (1) need not always be the sensible way to deÞne society's preferences in the presence of quotas. In many instances, e.g. when consti-tutional amendments are being considered, one of the alternatives if a statu quo while the other is the reform being considered for implementation, so that the two alternatives do not have symmetric roles. The statu quo is preferred to the reform iff the reform fails to attract a fraction of at least q of the voters. It is shown in Gilboa and Vieille (2002) that Theorem 1 extends to arbitrary q ≥ 1/2 with this modiÞed deÞnition of collective preferences.
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on an auxiliary result on random walks that we present next. Recall that a random walk is a sequence (S n ) n of random variables with iid one-step increments S n+1 − S n , n ∈ N.
Proposition 3 For every ε > 0, there exists N 0 such that the following holds. For each random walk (S n ), and each N ≥ N 0 , one has
We comment brießy on this result. Note Þrst that no integrability condition (mean, variance) is assumed on (S n ). The values N and N 2 that appear in (2) are somewhat arbitrary, what matters is that the number of terms in the summation be small compared to the index of the Þrst term.
We next explore the relationship of Proposition 3 to the Central Limit Theorem. Let (S n ) n be a random walk, such that the increment X n := S n − S n−1 (S 0 = 0) has a variance. By deÞnition, the sequence (X n ) n≥1
is iid. Assume for convenience that E [X If, say, m > 0, (S n ) converges in probability to +∞, hence P(S n ≥ 0 > S n+1 ) = P(S n ≥ 0 and X n+1 < −S n ) converges to zero. If now m = 0, S n , when positive, is typically of the order √ n. In particular, P(S n ≥ n 1/3 |S n ≥ 0) converges to one as n goes to inÞnity. Since P(X n+1 < −n 1/3 ) converges to zero, P(S n ≥ 0 and X n+1 < −S n ) converges to zero. Thus, for each integrable random walk, P(S n ≥ 0 > S n+1 ) converges to zero as n goes to inÞnity.
However, the convergence is not uniform, as shown by the example below.
Fix N ∈ N and let (X n ) n be an iid sequence with P N (X n = N) = . Plainly, the event {S N ≥ 0 > S N+1 } coincides with the event {S N = 0, X N+1 = −1} = {X N +1 = −1, X n = N for exactly one n ∈ {1, ..., N }}.
Therefore,
which converges to as N goes to inÞnity.
This example shows that P(S n ≥ 0 > S n+1 ) does not converge to zero, uniformly w.r.t. the random walk. In that respect, the statement in Propo-8 sition 3 is optimal.
An example
We here partially analyze an incomplete example, in order to illustrate why considering large amounts of information is helpful. Let M : P * (C) → R be given, such that M (C) = x (resp. M (C) = y) whenever |C| = 1 (resp. |C| = 2). Let π = (N, (w i )) be a (hypothesized) population such that
For C ∈ P * (C), let N(C) be the set of voters i ∈ N that strictly prefer The construction here relies on the idea that it is easier to reverse a voter's preferences by adding a single case if little information has been accumulated so far. A contrario, the basic insight of the proof to come is that this becomes very difficult if a substantial amount of information has been piled.
Votes with quota
Let ε ∈ (0,
). We let N 0 be given by Proposition 3.
Cyclic populations and random walks
Definition 4 A population (N, w) is said to be cyclic if there is a one-to-one function v : C → R such that given any permutation σ of C, there is a unique
Plainly, if (N, w) is a cyclic population, then |N| = |C|! .We label cases from 1 to |C|. Let ι be a randomly selected voter. For n ≤ |C|, we set X n := w ι (n). Plainly, the random vector (X 1 , ..., X |C| ) is a randomly ordered list of the elements of the set v(C).
Lemma 5 Let an integer K ≥ N 0 and a set C be given such that |C| ≥
. Let π be a cyclic population. One has
Proof. We rephrase the problem using the following auxiliary experiment.
Sample |C| elements c 1 , ..., c |C| from the set C, and let Y l := w 1 (c l ) be the weight assigned by the Þrst voter given the lth sampled item.
Let Q denote the law of ¡ c 1 , ..., c |C| ¢ when sampling is done without replacement. In that case, ¡ c 1 , ..., c |C| ¢ is a random permutation of the elements of C. Hence, the vector (Y 1 , ..., Y |C| ) is a randomly ordered list of the elements of v(C), i.e., the law of (Y 1 , ..., Y |C| ) coincides with the law of (X 1 , ..., X |C| ).
Thus, for each m,
Let Q 1 denote the law of ¡ c 1 , ..., c |C| ¢ when sampling is done with replacement. Plainly, the variables (Y 1 , ..., Y |C| ) are iid in that case. By the choice of K,
To conclude, we prove that the laws of (Y 1 , ..., Y N 1 ) under the two distributions Q and Q 1 are close, where
Sampling without replacement may be viewed as sampling with replacement, conditional on sampled items being all distinct:
For each pair (i, j) with i 6 = j,
. Therefore, for any event A that depends only upon (c 1 , ..., c N 1 ) , one has
The result follows, by (3), (4) and (5).
Proof of Theorem 2
We now prove Theorem 2. We argue by contradiction, and let π = (N, (w i ) i∈N )
be an hypothesized population such that M π = M. We proceed in three steps. We Þrst prove that w i may be assumed to be one-to-one for each i ∈ N . Next, we enlarge the population π to obtain a population π 0 that is a disjoint union of cyclic populations. We conclude by using Lemma 5.
Step 1 For each i ∈ N , let w Step 2 Set N := N × Σ, where Σ is the set of permutations of C. For (i, σ) ∈ N , we set w (i,σ) := w i • σ. In other words, the population π = (N, w)
is obtained from π by adding to each voter i ∈ N all permutations of w i .
Since M(C) = M π (C) depends only on |C|, one has M π = M . Note that, 13 for each i ∈ N , the subpopulation of π with set of voters {i} × P is a cyclic population.
Step 3: Conclusion
Let (ι, σ) ∈ N be a randomly selected voter. For n ≤ |C|, set X n := w (ι,σ) (n). For each Þxed i ∈ N, one has, by Lemma 5
Multiplying (6) by P(ι = i) and summing over i yields
On the other hand, since M π = M, one has P(X 1 + ... + X 2m ≥ 0) ≥ q and
On random walks
Recall that a random walk is a sequence (S n ) whose increments (S n+1 −S n ) n≥0 are iid. We set X n := S n − S n−1 ; S n is usually seen as the position at time n of a particle that moves from date n − 1 and n of an amount of X n . The law of the random walk (S n ) is determined by the law of X 1 .
We shall use an alternative construction of the random walk. DeÞne µ + (resp. −µ − ) to be the law of X 1 conditioned on X 1 ≥ 0 (resp. X 1 < 0) and 
Let κ n = |{l ≤ n : d l = +1}| be the number of upward moves up to n. Plainly, κ n has a binomial distribution B(n, p), and S n is distributed as S 
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Lemma 6 One has P(S n ≥ 0 > S n+1 ) ≤ q sup k∈{1,...,n} C k n p k q n−k .
Proof. We shall prove that, for each (y 1 , ..., y n ) ∈ R We next apply the inequality
with the family of events A m = {S 2m ≥ 0 > S 2m+1 } to get
The result follows by dividing by M .
